COMPONENTS OF SHORT-TERM SUCCESS IN PROJECTS TARGETING ILLEGAL LOGGING by Sahlhoff, Michelle
 
 
 
 
COMPONENTS OF SHORT-TERM SUCCESS IN PROJECTS TARGETING ILLEGAL LOGGING 
 
 
 
By  
Michelle Sahlhoff 
BS, Ball State University, 2008 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of  
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of International Development 
University of Pittsburgh 
2012 
  
ii 
 
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
 
 
 
This dissertation was presented 
by 
Michelle Sahlhoff 
It was defended on 
April 16, 2012 
and approved by 
Paul Nelson, PhD, Associate Professor 
Nuno Themudo, PhD, Assistant Professor 
Ilia Murtazashvili, PhD, Assistant Professor 
  
iii 
 
COMPONENTS OF SHORT-TERM SUCCESS IN PROJECTS TARGETING ILLEGAL LOGGING 
Michelle Sahlhoff, MID 
University of Pittsburgh, 2012 
Illegal logging, perpetuated by corruption, is a serious problem in developing countries, specifically Brazil, 
Indonesia, and Uganda.  Development projects focused on fighting illegal logging have not adequately 
been analyzed to assess the approaches taken in fighting corruption in addition to an academic literature 
review.  Through a literature review and analysis of development problems, this research focused on the 
roles of the project donor, implementer, cost, duration, participants, levels of participation, mechanisms, 
and success.  Next, a summary of observations for success from the projects were compiled to provide a 
thorough understanding of projects fighting illegal logging in the three focus countries.  The results of the 
literature review produced causes and effects of illegal logging in states, as well as recommended 
methods for combatting and preventing illegal logging with a focus on the corruption that can drive illegal 
logging.  The analysis of reviewed projects observed that none of the components identified appeared to 
be strongly necessary or unnecessary for a project to be successful or unsuccessful across countries, but 
some useful observations within countries were identified.  The summary of reasons for the 
successfulness and unsuccessfulness of projects produced five themes: ineffective relocation, successful 
economic mechanisms, coordination, satellite technology, and appropriate community management.  
Building on this, a theoretical framework was created that prepared hypotheses focusing on state 
capacity, classification of corruption, and implementing partner, as well as focusing on coordination and 
close relationships with stakeholders while utilizing satellite imagery to function as a check to ensure 
integrity between all actors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nationally protected forests clear-cut to the ground, acres upon acres of barren land, soil erosion, massive 
flooding, desertification.  These are all familiar phenomena that all can be linked back to a common cause: 
deforestation.  And when this deforestation is the result of illegal logging, the environment becomes more 
susceptible to abuse and resource exploitation.  In countries where illegal logging is a major driver of 
deforestation, the ecological results can be devastating to the environment, as mentioned above, and 
even more devastating to future generations when a pattern of dependency on these forests at 
unsustainable rates is realized. 
Illegal logging propelling deforestation is not a new phenomenon, but what has changed in recent years is 
the recognition that taking precautions to address the potential for corruption can be effective in fighting 
illegal logging.  In 2001, the United Nations (UN) Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) first recognized 
corruption in the forestry sector as a major cause of high rates of deforestation, specifically where illegal 
logging was involved (Koyunen and Yilmaz 2009).  By recognizing that corruption was a problem linked 
with illegal logging, FAO not only brought to the world stage corruption as a cause of illegal logging, but 
also became an advocate for focusing on this corruption.   
This realization has resulted in a number of different approaches to fighting illegal logging and corruption 
concurrently by building in mechanisms for transparency and accountability into projects with goals 
focusing on reducing illegal logging.  However, thus far there has not been any in-depth analysis to 
support any one approach or specific combination of approaches to see where illegal logging has actually 
diminished by the end of a project.  Without knowing what the best approaches are to fighting illegal 
logging and the corruption exacerbating it, it can be safely said that aid projects are not being as effective 
as they could with the limited resources by which they are constrained. 
A number of academic articles and books have been published describing the problems and case studies 
related to illegal logging, but this academic perspective only describes a piece of what is happening.  An 
all-encompassing approach would provide a new kind of framework which takes into account academic 
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analyses and development project evaluations and fuses the two together to create a more complete 
picture of corruption and its interlacing relationship with illegal logging.  This study examines first 
literature and then actual projects attempting to control illegal logging to build a theoretical framework 
that will serve as a base in future research initiatives to combat illegal logging. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
When deforestation (or the removal of trees) is the result of timber that is obtained in ways that are not 
in line with the local, regional, or national law, the product is considered illegal logging.  This definition 
extends beyond harvesting to include transporting, buying, or selling of timber that was illegally extracted 
(Zaitunah 2004).  Illegal logging can take many forms including logging in areas that are protected by law, 
logging species that are protected by law, illegally obtaining timber concessions, and extracting more 
timber than legally permitted.  Commonly, this is the result of governments’ poor enforcement of laws 
and regulations, either in a complicit manner (deliberately involving corruption) or in a negligent manner 
(often the result of a lack of resources to monitor and enforce laws) (Contreras-Hermosilla 2000).  Since 
numerous illegal logging activities are heavily linked with corruption, it is important to include this 
element as a major focus of study. 
Corruption for the purposes of this research is identified by the World Bank definition of “the abuse of 
public office for private gain” (Bannon 1999).  In general, it is recognized that corruption can be either 
grand—involving politicians, high-ranking government officials or military officers—or petty—involving 
local governing officials, low-ranking government employees, or junior military officers (Hanley and 
Rhodes 2004).  These different forms of corruption have diverse consequences for illegal logging practices 
and have varying degrees of impact on forests in local communities and nationally.  The literature clearly 
recognizes this problem and identifies the one-sidedness in the allocation and division of resources by 
those in power, not only in monetary value, but also in the resources available for the next generation 
(Winbourne 2002). 
3 
 
Corruption is a serious threat which is strengthening illegal logging through encouraging overexploitation 
and reducing the efficacy of conservation programs.  This in turn has harmful effects on forests, wildlife, 
fisheries, and other resources (Laurance 2004).  Not only does corruption endanger the environment and 
facilitate greed, in the forms of bribery and embezzlement, it steals from funds that were allocated for 
environmental programs.  These long-term impacts can starkly add up over generations of corrupt 
activities. 
Methods to address this corruption are numerous with mixed results.  Different historical, political, and 
social circumstances require an array of ideas to be tailored to the setting where corruption is causing or 
amplifying illegal logging.  A number of academic papers have been written to provide recommendations 
on these problems, but none have performed a comprehensive approach with multiple project 
evaluations to see what project aspects have worked best, and under what circumstances.  They have 
indeed, though, produced important insights into the causes, effects, and proposed solutions addressing 
illegal logging and addressing corruption. 
Causes of Corruption in Illegal Logging 
There are as many reasons for the cause of corruption as there are people who will participate in corrupt 
activities.  The age-old questions asked are whether people are acting in a corrupt manner as a result of 
bad institutions or bad individual behavior.  However, what this research is more interested in is the 
driving factors that are attempted and recommendations to address corruption through projects.  The 
most common causes cite underpaid government officials, weak institutions, and a culture tolerant of 
corruption. 
When government officials are not paid enough (a supposition that is often cited by academics), they 
need to resort to other means to be able to make ends meet (Laurance 2004).  They will therefore turn to 
accepting bribes in return for turning a blind eye to an illegal activity or to actually becoming involved in 
the illegal activity.  It is especially easy to accept bribes for illegal logging because there may be valuable 
trees that are easily accessible on protected public lands—ineffectively monitored by the government.  
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This timber can be sold for a high price and is far from the city, therefore unlikely to be missed by others, 
especially people with the influence and power to protect the forests; thus making it especially 
susceptible to capture through illegal logging (Koyunen and Yilmaz 2009) (Smith and Walpole 2005). 
Institutions—or rather the lack thereof—can also play an instrumental role in facilitating corruption.  
Lacking in transparency, accountability, and checks and balances, weak institutions allow for the weak 
enforcement of laws leading to improbability of harsh punishment (Koyunen and Yilmaz 2009) 
(Winbourne 2002) (Laurance 2004).  Their poor design—with few standardized processes and few but 
powerful officials in charge of a large spectrum of responsibilities—is susceptible to subjective individual 
interpretation which results in little objective information, further decreasing accountability and 
increasing opportunities for corruption (Winbourne 2002) (Koyunen and Yilmaz 2009). 
Culture is also cited frequently as a major source of corruption.  The guiding principles behind this idea are 
some societies’ traditions of nepotism, class privilege, and patron-client state relationships.  These 
relationships drive the formation of institutions and reflect the acceptance of the local people as the 
conventional way in which operations are expected to be run (Laurance 2004) (Robbins 2000) (Mulder 
2011).  This also translates into a lack of respect for rule of law.  Because laws are expected to be broken 
and officials corrupt, the logic runs: why should those with less follow the law while those with more do 
not (Winbourne 2002).  Under this theoretical premise, the cultures that place a low value on protecting 
public lands with trees will be even more susceptible to corruption causing illegal logging resulting in high 
rates of deforestation. 
Effects of Corruption on Illegal Logging 
The effects of corruption on forests are clear to see and easy to measure—where there were once trees 
on protected public land, there are now barren expanses.  And the estimates of illegal logging and its 
timber production are staggering.  In 2002, rates for illegal logging were estimated as high as 90 percent 
in Brazil and 80 percent in Indonesia (Hanley and Rhodes 2004).  And in Uganda, where only 18% of the 
ground is covered by forested area, illegal logging rates are maintained at high levels (“Uganda” 2011). 
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Corruption allows illegal logging to flourish and tropical forests to be destroyed.  Beyond this, the indirect 
environmental degradation results in a loss of natural habitat for the flora and fauna that made their 
homes where protected trees once stood.  This loss is particularly significant in Brazil, Indonesia, and 
Uganda because of the biodiversity hotspots that are located in illegally logged areas (Laurance 2004). 
Illegal logging caused by corruption also has direct effects on the human populations near forests which 
are illegally logged.  These communities are losing valuable timber and firewood without proper 
compensation or a means for retribution.  Indigenous people are intimately affected with the loss of use 
of traditionally managed forests and few means of alternative livelihoods.   Future generations will also be 
affected as illegal logging is not generally concerned with sustainable harvests, resulting in a great loss of 
the natural resource to future generations without compensation (Laurance 2004). 
What makes this system worse is the fact that the relationship between corruption and illegal logging is 
more than codependent—it is a vicious cycle with each act making the cycle worse.  Once corruption and 
illegal logging both become a way of life, a natural give and take creates a deepening hole that will 
demand more.  Amacher et al. (2011) describes on page 102 the relationship between corruption and 
illegal logging as such: 
Corruption and illegal logging are unarguably intertwined, with each made worse by the 
presence of the other.  We find that enforcement of the government intent on punishing forest 
crimes cannot be considered independent of bribery incentives, and more importantly, that 
royalty design cannot be considered independently of other instruments. 
Recommended Strategies to Address Corruption Fueling Illegal Logging 
In recognizing the causes and effects of illegal logging, literature has gone a step further to recommend 
methods for reform.  It is this stitch holding the illegal logging processes together that is so important to 
unravel in order to begin to make effective changes for the present and future generations.  In general, 
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the academic literature puts forth two strategies to fight corruption in illegal logging: a top-down 
approach and a grassroots approach.   
The top-down approach includes international aid reforms and institutional reforms to change incentives 
within the country, ultimately rooting out corruption.  The logic proceeds that the problem of corruption 
spurring illegal logging is the result of a well-organized group of illegal loggers that are bending and 
breaking laws with inadequate consequences.  Recommended aid reforms include increasing foreign aid 
in anti-corruption projects in committed countries, decreasing or halting aid in countries that are not 
making valiant efforts to change their ways, and enforcing international agreements through stern 
punishment of offending multinational corporations (Laurance 2004).   
These institutional reforms typically consist of legal reforms (e.g. legislation passed to update or improve 
laws) or process reforms (e.g. simplifying and streamlining administrative processes) (Winbourne 2002).  
These reforms aim to change the corruption within the administration which is behaving corruptly.  This 
type of reform may be particularly effective when grand, centralized corruption is the root of the problem 
and high-level reform is called upon to address it. 
The second approach focuses on the strengthening the grassroots level to increase awareness and 
encourage monitoring by the local community.  Recommended actions include establishing village 
community committees or citizen watchdog groups to raise awareness about any illegal logging or 
corruption which leads to it.  In addition, these groups can monitor forests and processes for obtaining 
logging permits to catch current illegal logging and prevent it in the future (Robbins 2000) (Winbourne 
2002).  These reforms can change the incentives for ordinary or small-scale participants in illegal logging 
by increasing the likelihood that they will get caught and punished without a corrupt safety net to bail 
them out.   
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BACKGROUND 
Some of the worst cases of illegal logging, worsened by corruption, have come from Brazil, Indonesia, and 
Uganda.  Each country has a significant problem with illegal logging and is seeing strain on protected local 
and national forests.  Each also struggles with different levels of corruption that can seep into and worsen 
illegal logging operations.  While each shares these common problems, the history, politics and culture 
surrounding them promote each country its own path to develop specific, targeted approaches.  Projects 
that take place in these countries to fight illegal logging use wide-ranging methods with varied success, 
but understanding the methods used in each and why those methods were successful or unsuccessful will 
shed light on what types of projects may work and in what circumstances. 
Brazil   
Though illegal logging has been a historical problem in Brazil, there has recently been hope that Brazil is 
becoming successful decreasing their illegal logging.  Although, due to the nature of illegal logging it is 
difficult to obtain an accurate estimate of the percentage of timber production, multiple illegal logging 
monitors have all seen decreases in illegal log production (Lawson and MacFaul 2010).  As described 
below, rates have been decreasing steadily since 2004 leading many to look to Brazil as a potential model 
for success. 
The path of Brazil’s timber-tracking system has been revered as a model for other countries to follow.  
Brazil has been transforming from a country with an illegal logging problem to a country that is actively 
fighting an illegal logging problem.  Early on though, the first attempt to control illegal logging had little 
success, as its main enforcement technique was to increase fines associated with these illegal activities.  
These fines proved to be unsuccessful because the high-level corruption involved in illegal logging in Brazil 
would still have a large payoff even if the fines were enforced (Barreto et al. 2006). 
The rule of law in Brazil has been strengthening since the government began in 2005 to crack down on 
illegal logging as a result of Brazil’s new tough Public Minister.  After 89 arrests in 2004, half of which were 
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government employees and some were upper-level employees for the prominent Brazilian NGO IMAZON, 
illegal logging activities were estimated to have decreased by 31 percent the following year (Hanley and 
Rhodes 2004).  This example demonstrates how top level commitment can be effective and taken 
seriously. 
Most recently, Brazil has created a system that incorporates modern technology to track timber.  
Incorporating tools for public monitoring available on the internet, Brazil has created a system for alerting 
authorities if illegal logging is happening.  Brazil has set up a system to cross-check reports from the public 
with its own internal knowledge of illegal logging activities.  By setting up these public and internal 
systems, the government has created a platform for civil societies and citizens to incorporate and share 
knowledge.  This opening up of communication allows for people who may live remotely and marginalized 
groups to report information on illegal logging practically in real time (“Meeting the Challenge” 2009). 
However, it should be noted that nothing happens in a vacuum and there may be other forces driving the 
decrease in illegal logging in Brazil.  The demand for timber may have decreased as aluminum and other 
similar materials are becoming common substitutes for wood products.  Also, the global recession in 2008 
has likely affected the timber trade, which may have likely caused the payoff for illegal timber to be lower 
thus decreasing the economic incentive to participate in illegal logging—especially given the increase in 
fines (Lawson and MacFaul 2010). 
Indonesia 
In Indonesia, the problem is growing with an increase in deforestation of 107% between the periods of 
2000-2005 and 2005-2010 (Butler 2010).  It has been estimated that illegal logging makes up as much as 
80 percent of its forest removal (Hanley and Rhodes 2004).  Though illegal logging has been identified as a 
problem in Indonesia since the 1990s and despite the numerous efforts of the international and local 
communities, there has been little progress in curbing illegal logging. 
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The corruption in Indonesia’s illegal logging has changed significantly when comparing illegal logging 
under and after President Suharto’s rule.  During Suharto’s rule, illegal logging was monitored by the 
centralized government to ensure that the proper kickbacks to the higher-up government officials were 
taking place.  This strong model served to benefit those in charge and also created an organized and 
recognized system of corruption, considered to be fairly stable.  After Suharto’s rule ended, the top-down 
organized corruption associated with illegal logging also ended.  In its place has grown the decentralized 
petty corruption that plagues Indonesia today.  Suharto’s legacy of corruption is still strong and the 
complex networks that support it are still thriving, the only difference is now there is more uncertainty 
and less institutionalization of the corrupt illegal logging practices (Hanley and Rhodes 2004). 
According to McCarthy (2002) this complex network in Indonesia today is still presenting significant 
challenges to anyone seeking to address the corruption spurring illegal logging.  Due to the complicit 
agreement of local village leaders, illegal logging has benefited and strengthened many powerful groups 
in the short-term.  These groups have formed relationships built on mutual trust and benefits that have, 
through decentralization, been given the opportunity to grow.  Luca Tacconi (2007) further explains on 
page 82 the intricate relationships: 
Officials exploiting their positions could generate significant rents, both for their own personal 
use and for political purposes.  Key local politicians could increase their popular support by 
expanding district budgets to provide for projects and programs that offered opportunities to 
clients and followers.  At the same time, entrepreneurs and their agents could maintain timber 
operations by entering into exchanges that involved extralegal gifts and favors with certain local 
politicians and State functionaries.   
This challenging dynamic creates problems for projects using traditional theories pushing developing 
countries to move towards decentralization.  Recommended by foreign entities that did not fully 
understand the local operations of illegal logging in Indonesia, government implementation of 
decentralization has in fact worsened the circumstances that allow for illegal logging.  Civil society is 
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therefore being given the limelight to address corruption, as well as change the culture around illegal 
logging in Indonesia (Arnold 2008). 
Uganda 
Corruption in illegal logging in Uganda is far more different from the corruption in Indonesia and Brazil.  It 
received significantly less attention from the international community, even though the entire forested 
land area in Uganda is now just 18 percent with almost no primary forest still intact.  This is an even 
greater calamity when considering that some of the highest concentration of biodiversity in Africa—over 
5,000 plant species, 345 mammals, and 1,000 birds—are losing their natural habitats (“Uganda” 2011). 
Widespread corruption leading to low enforcement of a ban on exports of raw timber from Uganda has 
fueled the illegal logging activities.  Illegal logging is so rampant, everyone from forestry officers to the 
police to government officials are all alleged to be involved in the scheme.  With such widespread 
involvement in corruption, it is difficult for any government agency to create the needed reforms 
(“Uganda” 2011).   
The Ugandan National Forest Authority (NFA) has unsuccessfully attempted to crackdown on illegal 
logging, but received criticism from high-ranking authorities including President Museveni.  It is unpopular 
for the agency to take measures to fight corruption leading to illegal logging, leaving NFA frustrated and 
ineffective.  NFA has recently focused on turning its efforts to awareness among the public and also 
timber dealers to identify and prevent illegal logging (“Uganda” 2011). 
While some see Uganda’s institutional model as a success, with NFA managing forestry and its sister 
agency Forest Inspection Division (FID) which regulates NFA, significantly more donor aid has been given 
to NFA to have stronger managing capabilities.  This leaves FID with relatively fewer financial resources to 
regulate the increased work that NFA is able to conduct.  In addition, there is relatively low monitoring by 
independent civil societies of either of these agencies which can lead to corruption internally or externally 
by officials in either agency (“A Guide” 2005). 
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Within NFA it has been alleged that acquiring land rights involves so much red tape that the only way to 
attain legal logging rights is through favoritism and bribery.  Companies that are able to acquire rights to 
legally log, and are required to do so while meeting sustainable standards, are unable to meet the local 
demand for timber.  Thus, a local black market has been established with a number of illegal loggers and 
traders (Natural Enterprise 2005). 
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Table 1: Summary of Key Country Features 
Indicators Brazil Indonesia Uganda 
Extent of 
Deforestation 
57.2% of total land is 
forested with 6.9% of total 
forested land considered 
protected areas 
60% of total land is 
forested with 20.9% of 
total forested  land 
considered protected 
areas 
18% of total land is 
forested with 13% of 
total forested land 
considered protected 
areas  
Annual Rate of 
Deforestation 
From 2000-2005, 
deforestation rate of 0.6% 
From 1990-2000, 
deforestation rate of 11% 
From 2005-2010, 
deforestation rate of 
2.72% 
Estimated Rate 
of Illegal Logging 
Up to 90 percent of 
deforestation is illegal 
logging 
Up to 80 percent of 
deforestation is illegal 
logging 
Nearly all deforestation 
is from illegal logging 
Trend of Illegal 
Logging Rate 
Decreasing Increasing Not well measured 
Prevalence of 
Corruption  
Moderate petty corruption High petty and grand 
corruption 
Very high petty and 
grand corruption 
Actors Heavily 
Involved in Illegal 
Logging 
Local loggers fail to acquire 
and follow appropriate 
licenses, bribing 
government officials when 
confronted 
Indonesian military is 
accused of playing a large 
role, with some military 
members even operating 
their own illegal sawmills 
District forestry officers, 
rangers, the police and 
local government 
officials have all been 
accused of involvement 
Scale of Illegal 
Logging 
Medium-scale illegal logging 
is trending down and small 
scale logging is trending up 
because it is difficult to 
detect by satellite 
Large-scale with firms 
involved in illegal logging 
colluding with authorities 
and customs for export 
Small-scale with local 
communities using 
forests that have 
become national 
protected parks 
State Capacity 
for Monitoring 
and Enforcement 
Satellite  timber tracking 
system builds government 
capacity to see where illegal 
logging is occurring in days 
 
Combined with the 
transparency that allows 
the public access to the 
satellite imagery, 
opportunities for corruption 
in IBAMA have plummeted  
  
Overall, medium to high 
state capacity to control 
illegal logging 
Lack of enforcement 
largely from kickbacks 
from illegal logging 
companies to not enforce 
laws 
 
Ministry of Forestry relies 
heavily on foot patrol for 
monitoring and 
enforcement  
 
 
Overall, low state 
capacity to control illegal 
logging 
NFA and FID have been 
considered to be 
underpaid and have low 
job security as a driving 
reason for their 
corruption   
 
NFA relies heavily on 
foot patrol for 
monitoring and 
enforcement 
 
Overall, very low state 
capacity to control illegal 
logging 
Sources (Chemonics 2001), (“Uganda” 2011), (Mupada 2009), (“Illegal” 2008), (“Rainforests” 2006), 
(“Forests, Grasslands, and Drylands—Brazil” 2003), (“Forests, Grasslands, and Drylands—Indonesia” 
2003), (Palmer 2000), (“Indonesia” 2010), (Chan 2010), (Barreto et al. 2006), (“Logging” 2005), (McNeish 
et al. 2010), (Hanley and Rhodes 2004) 
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METHODOLOGY 
The methodology for this research includes an extremely detailed search for project evaluations through 
search engines, academic journals, international NGO websites, bilateral project evaluations, multilateral 
project evaluations, and other sources heavily involved in illegal logging issues.  Some useful sources such 
as Rainforest Action Network (RAN) micro projects may have provided interesting counterpoints to some 
of the larger, perhaps less confrontational organizations that were selected.  Unfortunately, either RAN 
did not evaluate their projects or does not make these evaluations available to the public, thus they were 
not included.   
Originally, it was anticipated that ten projects should be found in each country to get a good sense of all 
types of illegal logging projects.  However, as the search for projects commenced and progressed, it was 
clear that each project was very unique and none of the stories or observations in projects involving illegal 
logging should be left out.  Thus, more projects were reviewed, totaling in 52 case studies. 
Project sources and focuses were varied and intended to include the broadest range of sources and 
experiences.  While it is difficult to compare data from these different sources that may have differing 
opinions, motivations, and observations, this gives the broadest and most comprehensive explanation of 
what is happening on the ground in these countries.  In addition to coming from varied sources, this 
research identified a number of variables that are part of projects including the donor, implementer, 
duration, cost, participants, levels of participation, mechanisms used to complete the projects, success of 
the project, and impact in illegal logging. 
Donors have been coded as bilateral donors, multilateral donors, private donors, and NGOs to give 
anonymity to the donors.  The object of this research is not to name and shame any particular 
organization or agency, but rather to provide a general overview of comparable observations without 
becoming entangled in the specifics of which particular government or organization was succeeding or 
failing.  The donor has been recognized as an important variable because different donors (e.g. bilateral, 
multilateral, NGOs) have different institutional incentives in aid delivery which may affect the 
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effectiveness of the project design and support received by implementers over the course of the project 
(Martens et al. 2001).   
The implementer is important to consider for similar reasons (e.g. institutional incentives) and, beyond 
that, there may be principal-agent relationships between donors and implementers depending on the 
institutional structures in place.  Furthermore, foreign or far-removed implementers that are not familiar 
with the local culture, regulations, and practices may be less effective than local implementers (Martens 
et al. 2001).  For instance, a multilateral donor aiding a local government implementer may be less likely 
to face a principal-agent problem than an international NGO implementer; however, when the 
temptation of corruption is involved, the international NGO may be the better choice. 
Duration and cost can play important roles in project success and failure.  Though there has been little 
research investigating these project components, these project components have been noted in research 
to play substantial roles in the appropriateness of the timeframes and budgets.   In project evaluations, it 
is common to find evidence that project timeframes or budgets were too constricted.  Research has 
demonstrated that project duration and budget planning abilities have been components impacting 
project success or failures (Ahsan and Gunawan 2009). 
Participants and types of participation—who is participating and how they are participating—has been 
identified as crucial to project success, especially in projects seeking to address illegal logging.  High 
participation of all stakeholders can add value to project design and successful implementation, and 
participation of local community members and forest users plays a large role in ensuring compliance with 
the project goals especially if they are being asked to be involved in a monitoring project component 
(Moran and Ostrom 2005). 
The project mechanisms—or activities as many of the projects refer to them—are the actual undertakings 
that are carried out during the project and can be categorized.  It is crucial that project activities are in line 
with the intended goal and clearly lay out the logic of their impact.  The proper execution of these 
mechanisms are intended to meet the project goals (in these cases, reducing illegal logging) so it is crucial 
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that the appropriate mechanisms are in place and are achieving their objectives.  It is important that the 
mechanisms consider the institutions and culture that is propelling the corruption and illegal logging, and, 
in theory, addressing both may result in a successful project.   
The success of the project and its measured impact on illegal logging are included as indicators of the 
overall success of the project.  The success of the project focuses on those components that are related to 
illegal logging objectives and whether or not they were successful on whole.  Combined with the 
measured impact on illegal logging in the area, varying subjective and objective indicators analysis can 
join to form a cumulative depiction of successful and unsuccessful projects. 
The extraction of this information is intended to give a quick and accurate sense of the project description 
and provide a baseline to compare across projects.  While most of the data is objective (e.g. duration, 
cost) other indicators are more subjective (e.g. participants, levels of participation).  Before setting off to 
conduct a full study based on expected findings, a small subset of six projects was taken and coded 
according to the original plan.  Quickly the merit of this activity was realized.   
The original design began by identifying the donor, implementer, duration, cost, participants, levels of 
participation, mechanisms used to complete the projects, success of each mechanism, success of the 
project as a whole, and impact in illegal logging.  It was not difficult to identify the donor and 
implementer, but duration and cost were actually more difficult to measure than expected.  Participants 
and levels of participation, though seemingly clearly laid out, needed to be refocused.  Success of each 
mechanism and overall success that projects reported appeared to be irrelevant for activities not related 
to illegal logging that were included in some projects; only the overall project success of activities 
involving illegal logging was included in final analysis. 
Project duration was not difficult initially.  It essentially was divided by how many months the project took 
to complete from beginning to end.  This started to get more convoluted as projects involving great detail 
from large organizations, such as the World Bank, can require on project evaluations.  The definition then 
became how many months the project lasted from the effective date to the closing date.  Not all projects 
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include the project design process in their timeframe so it is more comparable to use the date that most 
aligns with after the formal agreements were signed and dates when the implementer actually began 
carrying out the project. 
Some budgets were very detailed, separated into what was exactly expended on illegal logging activities 
and what was spent on other aspects of the project that may not have been as directly related to illegal 
logging or its associated anti-corruption.  After a great deal of consideration, the total budgets for project 
aiming to reduce illegal logging as a whole were included to not presume that the other aspects were 
completely mutually exclusive.  For example, if part of a project aims to protect gorillas and educate 
people about gorillas and their habitat, this activity may in fact be helping to reduce illegal logging in the 
gorilla habitat.  Another example is if a project takes place across three countries and promotes 
knowledge-sharing on anti-corruption in forestry between the countries.  This research may only be 
interested in one of those countries, but there may be spillover benefits that the other two countries are 
creating.  Thus, cost will only be included in this research as an indicator to show the scale and magnitude 
of projects. 
Participants were initially easily identified and classified, until levels of participation were included.  It was 
predetermined that Pretty’s typology of participation would be used (Cornwall 2008), but applying it to 
the case studies proved more challenging than anticipated.  This is by far the most subjective element in 
the analysis of the case studies that still has a structured method.  Not only is it subjective for the coder, it 
is subjective for whomever wrote the evaluation or case study.  The way in which a situation is worded 
will create a certain perception for a reader that may or may not be accurate to the project.  Furthermore, 
an issue arose in determining how participation should be coded where there were multiple evaluations 
of a single case study.   
To maintain accuracy, Pretty’s typology of participation was followed and consulted often to ensure 
consistency.  In the cases of multiple sources regarding a single case study (which is always preferable to 
one source), it was determined that it was best to identify the different roles portrayed in the different 
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evaluations to obtain the most complete description of participation perceived by the evaluator.  In 
addition, if multiple local NGOs were involved in a project at different levels, it would be represented as 
such.  While this system is not as perfect as traveling to each of these project sites and interviewing 
stakeholders, it does maintain consistency throughout, making the levels of participation represented in 
evaluations and literature more comparable to one another. 
The mechanisms for success are basic narrow categories that include awareness activities that raise 
awareness through education or information sharing, monitoring (specifically forests or biodiversity) for 
enforcement or for a baseline and post-project comparison, and legal which refers to new regulations 
begin formed, legislation passed, or executive orders issued.  It was starkly underestimated how relevant 
an economic mechanism was and many projects were determined to give people economic alternatives 
to illegal logging, and immediately it was adopted as a mechanism.  Intentionally excluded were capacity-
building activities.  These are inherently a part of each project; even in the gesture of awarding a large 
amount of money to an organization, its capacity will grow to meet that financial management need.  
Additionally it is very difficult to demonstrate or prove that a project actually built capacity because it is 
much less tangible than the other mechanisms. 
Only the cases that appear to have the clearest successes or failures were chosen to include in this study.  
The selection for success and unsuccessful was based on a combination of the case study’s own 
description of its success and of the actual demonstrated reduction in illegal logging rates.  Cases were 
selected to emphasize variation in project successes within countries that suffer from illegal logging.  The 
success cases included safeguards against corruption in illegal logging while the unsuccessful cases all 
included indications of corruption with limited or absent means of addressing and reducing it.   
The most successful projects are most effective when they can actually demonstrate impact.  One case 
study was included under the unsuccessful category that was classified by the evaluator as a success, but 
was quite evidently unsuccessful at meeting the project objectives and decreasing illegal logging.  This 
was mentioned only as a side-note to demonstrate the need for caution in simply taking a cursory glance 
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at a project evaluation and believing it was successful without an in-depth understanding of the situation.  
Unsuccessful cases were easily identified and described after exhaustive review of project evaluations.  In 
one such case for example, forest loss rates were actually increasing in protected parks, indicating 
potentially higher levels of illegal logging.  
Even in the projects selected as “successes” based on their project evaluations or other reliable 
documentation cannot ensure certainty that the written words accurately depict the true impact of these 
projects.  Of extreme suspicion are project evaluations written by aid recipients to donors.  This stems 
from inherent conflicts of interest that may encourage recipients to describe the project as more 
successful than it actually was in order to attract future funding.  In these cases, it almost seems that the 
recipients are catering to what the donor wanted to be happening in the project rather than what the 
organization actually succeeded in accomplishing.  It is important to keep in mind these incentives and 
maintain a critical eye when analyzing evaluations that are not from independent sources. 
SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL CASES 
As described in the methodology, these projects were selected because they demonstrated the clearest 
achievement of success or failure in their project, especially when including the measured decrease of 
illegal logging or surrounding corruption (a considerably difficult task).  The cases are divided by country, 
having a short description of the case study and separating successful and unsuccessful cases.  The 
comparison of the successful and unsuccessful cases demonstrate the challenges within countries and 
aspects that work to address illegal logging and the corruption that generally accompanies it.  The 
successful and unsuccessful cases will be reviewed followed by a summary and analysis of how the cases 
are similar, how they differ, and what can be learned from each. 
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Table 2: Brazil Successful and Unsuccessful Case Overviews 
Project Title Strengthening 
Voices for 
Better Choices 
Mamairaua 
Sustainable 
Development 
Reserve 
Project 
Reducing 
Emissions from 
Deforestation 
and Forest 
Degradation 
(REDD): Brazil 
Matto Grosso 
Natural 
Resources 
Project 
Rondonia 
Natural 
Resources 
Management 
Project 
Donor Bilateral 
donor 
Bilateral donor 
National 
government 
Local 
government 
International 
NGOs 
Bilateral donor Multilateral 
donor 
Multilateral 
donor 
Implementer International 
NGO 
Academic 
institutions 
National 
government 
National NGO 
National 
government 
Local 
government 
Local 
government 
Duration 
(months) 
48 120 36 118 117 
Cost (USD) $5,728,448 $8,935,452 $1,500,000 $24,190,000 $21,430,000 
Participant 
(level of 
participation) 
Local NGO 
(material 
incentives, 
functional) 
International 
NGO 
(functional, 
consultation) 
Private 
organizations 
(functional) 
Local 
government 
(functional) 
Academic 
(interactive) 
Local 
government 
(interactive) 
National NGO 
(interactive) 
Donor 
(functional) 
Local 
community 
(consultation) 
Local 
governments 
(consultation) 
Private 
organizations 
(consultation) 
NGOs 
(consultation, 
manipulative) 
National 
government 
(interactive) 
Indigenous 
peoples 
(manipulative) 
Local 
government 
(interactive) 
National 
government 
(passive) 
Local 
community 
(manipulative) 
Local NGOs 
(consultation) 
Indigenous 
community 
(consultation) 
Local 
government 
(interactive) 
National 
government 
(passive) 
Local NGOs 
(manipulative) 
Mechanisms Economic Legal  
Awareness 
Monitoring 
Legal 
Monitoring 
Legal 
Monitoring 
Economic 
Legal 
Monitoring 
Economic 
Project 
Success 
Successful Successful Successful Unsuccessful Unsuccessful 
Effect on 
Illegal 
Logging 
Not measured Practically all 
logging is now 
done legally, 
and verified by 
the local 
community 
Since 2004 
rates of 
deforestation 
have been 
decreasing in 
the Legal 
Amazon   
Some reduction 
in 
deforestation, 
but little 
progress made 
due to conflict 
with IBAMA 
Successful 
enforcing of 
conservation 
areas, but no 
effort to 
calculate 
reduction in 
illegal logging 
Sources: (Pires 2010), (Hesselink et al. 2009), (Koziell and Inoue 2006), (McNeish et al. 2010), (“Rodonia” 
2003), (“Mato” 2003) 
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Brazil Successful Case Summaries  
The synopses of the successful projects in Brazil are presented in Table 2.  These projects were all funded, 
at least in part, by bilateral donors and used diverse implementers.  The timeframe of these successful 
cases ranged from 36 to 120 months, and project costs ranged from $1.5 million to $8.9 million.  All cases 
involved a number of stakeholders, all at varying levels of participation.  Although two of the three 
projects involved the national government as implementers and used legal reform, all three projects had 
very different means of achieving their goals.  Two of these success cases involved a bottom-up approach, 
while the REDD project was clearly top-down. 
It is interesting to observe that only the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
(REDD): Brazil project had a monitoring component built-in to the project, and this component used 
information already available to the public.  It is a wonder that the other projects did not take advantage 
of this mechanism and use it to their advantage.  Instead, the Strengthening Voices for Better Choices 
(SVBC) project and the Mamairaua Sustainable Development Reserve (MSDR) project were only informed 
through no measurement at all or local observations (which were not further explained), respectively 
(Pires 2010). 
The commonalities among these success cases come down to excellent coordination and communication.  
As presented in Table 1, there are many actors involved in each of these projects, with many 
opportunities for communication breakdowns, cooperation frustrations, and responsibility confusions.  
But instead of collapses, clearly defined roles and expectations were part of each of these successful 
projects.  The accountability that each project had with respect to roles and expectations of all 
stakeholders is a likely reason that corruption did not undermine these successful projects. 
The SVBC project’s greatest success in illegal logging was linking the problem as inherently a governance 
problem rather than a law enforcement problem.  Through coordination with national and international 
NGOs, the SVBC project developed a three-pronged approach to address illegal logging: championing best 
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practices, instilling responsible markets, and cultivating beneficial forest governance practices (Pires 
2010). 
Through the creation of the Modular Implementation and Verification System for Forest Certification 
(SIM), the SVBC project worked to promote forest certification for logging companies (Pires 2010).  Six 
forest companies joined in this initiative, becoming certified within four years of membership through the 
support of the SIM program (Hesselink et al. 2009).  By coordinating with local NGOs and local 
governments, steps have been taken towards a public purchasing program; culminating with the signing 
of the responsible public procurement degree (Pires 2010) (Hesselink et al. 2009).   
Through coordination with private sector, civil society and government institutions, the SVBC project 
identified areas of governance to improve.  Proposed public reforms were then shared with the 
government and led to the restructuring of the Acre Forest Council as well as other State Councils.  These 
reforms then helped to remove red tape that was causing inefficiencies and creating the opportunity for 
bribery.  This project has successfully demonstrated how organizing industry to improve good governance 
can be effective and prove to be potentially less risky in reducing corruption than trying to reform the 
government as a sole producer (Hesselink et al. 2009).   
The MSDR project was successful in turning a forest where local communities could not legally log into 
one in which local communities were able to obtain property rights for logging legally.  Sustainably 
produced timber has a higher market value and it cannot be confiscated or held for a bribe by the 
Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources IBAMA—a Brazilian agency with a 
strong reputation for corrupt dealings.  Thus, there are significant economic incentives for the local 
communities to participate in local sustainable logging when given the option to do so legally.   
Because the local community was highly involved in this project, they had the incentive to engage in 
monitoring and enforcement to prevent illegal logging activities.  Because of this incentive and the high 
value placed on monitoring, illegal logging has virtually disappeared (as have the intervening government 
officials who had accepted bribes in exchange for turning a blind eye towards illegal logging).  Allowing 
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this local ownership has not only saved the government valuable resources, but has also reduced the 
temptation of corrupt individuals who would otherwise participate in illegal logging activities (Koziell and 
Inoue 2006). 
The successful REDD project is likely to have spurred policy debates and steps towards reducing 
deforestation.  By allowing Brazil to independently take ownership of its own regulatory monitoring 
systems, this project left the sense of leadership and responsibility in the hands of Brazilians.  This has led 
to an impressive Brazilian system of monitoring and enforcing forest policies, considered by some to be a 
model that other nations should look to when developing their own monitoring and enforcing systems 
(McNeish et al. 2010).   
On a local level, the REDD project made payments to both families and communities for abstaining from 
the benefits of illegal logging, especially in the protected national parks.   While financial support 
appealed to Brazilians, the donor enjoyed lots of international attention for the successes of the Amazon 
Fund.  The REDD project has quietly shown a commitment to Brazilian forestry, leading others to do the 
same.  This high level leadership has had a positive impact and fits in well with high level forest 
governance reforms in Brazil that were already occurring (McNeish et al. 2010). 
Brazil Unsuccessful Case Summaries 
The clearest examples of project unsuccessful are both by chance funded by a multilateral donor and 
implemented by local governments.  They were implemented around the same time, for 117 to 118 
months and included some, but not all relevant stakeholders.  The costs were similar as well, totaling 
about $24.1 million and 21.4 million each.  The mechanisms used were similar, and in both cases it 
appears that the Brazilian agency IBAMA was not participating or actively working against the projects.   
It is important to note that some multilateral donors use extensive detail in their project evaluations and 
take great care in attempting to depict the situation as accurately as possible.  Because of this care, it is 
fairly obvious when they have a successful or unsuccessful project.  Other projects evaluations that were 
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reviewed were opaque or attempting to portray a positive situation when it was unclear if the project was 
truly successful or unsuccessful.  These project evaluations are only excluded to reduce the ambiguity 
surrounding what is a clear-cut successful or unsuccessful project. 
Because these two projects were implemented and finished very near one another, the multilateral donor 
choose to save resources and duplicate some information from one project report to the next.  Though 
these were two clearly separate projects, for the sake of convenience some sections of the evaluations 
are similar, if not identical.  Therefore, this snapshot will begin with the similarities and finish with the 
noted differences between the projects that may have led to their failure. 
During the implementation of the two projects, the local government was under tight management from 
IMF-imposed conditions for spending.  At the local level the government was therefore under close 
watch, reducing opportunities for high level embezzlement.  This kept a hard line on any potential 
“leakages” that could result from corruption in the national government.  However, there were still cases 
where funds were reallocated to other Brazilian projects that were more visible instead of to the agreed 
upon projects (“Rodonia” 2003). 
In both projects, local civil societies and private organizations did not agree with the project objectives 
and had limited involvement in the project design and implementation.  The multilateral donor and local 
government had severely misjudged the local communities that were assumed to be, at a minimum, not 
opposed to the development objectives that the multilateral donor and local government had agreed 
upon to help the local communities (“Rodonia” 2003).   
The limited enthusiasm of the local government and poor working relationship between local people and 
government agencies caused confusion at best and conflict at worst.  This could be because there was not 
a role for IBAMA built into the project designs.  Whatever the reason, it is safe to say that IBAMA was 
uninvolved or even opposed to these two projects (“Mato” 2003).  It is likely that the multilateral donor 
recognized the increased risk for corruption if IBAMA was involved and chose not to involve the agency to 
reduce that risk.  However, the multilateral donor did not take into account the propensity for IBAMA to 
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retaliate by attempting to undermine these projects.  Better planning may have included a place for 
IBAMA to be involved with proper accountability and transparency mechanisms and clearly defined roles 
and responsibilities. 
Project implementation did vary at the state level.  The Mato Grosso Natural Resources (Mato Grosso) 
project did have success in creating a robust environmental agency, expanding forest conservations areas, 
and implementing a rural licensing system that leverages local enforcement authorities.  There was 
pushback by political interests however in the expansion of these conservation areas and progress halted.  
Anticipated zoning law changes under the Mato Grosso may be delayed and muddled.  In the Rondonia 
Natural Resources Management (Rondonia) project, the local government made efforts to push through 
the agreed upon zoning law and successfully had a new zoning law in place in 2000.  In general, the local 
government was not very strong but did manage to carve out state conservation units and improve 
environmental conservation legal structures at the state level (“Mato” 2003). 
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Table 3: Indonesia Successful and Unsuccessful Case Overviews 
Project Title Ecotourism Product 
Development as a 
Means to Supplant 
Illegal Logging in the 
Tangkahan Area of 
Leuser National Park 
Indonesia Forest 
and Media 
Project 
(INFORM) 
Kerinci Seblat ICDP Implementing the 
Conservation 
Concession 
Approach on 
Sumatra’s Siberut 
Island 
Donor International NGO Multilateral 
donor 
Multilateral donor International NGO 
Implementer Local NGO International 
NGOs 
International NGO 
National government 
National NGO 
Duration 
(months) 
8 24 80 12 
Cost (USD) $22,325 $1,232,055 $46,869,000 $92,840 
Participant 
(level of 
participation) 
International NGO 
(passive, functional) 
National government 
(passive, functional) 
Foreign government 
(passive) 
Local NGO 
(interactive) 
Local community 
(interactive) 
Local government 
(functional) 
Media (functional) 
International 
NGOs (material 
incentives, 
consultation) 
Local NGOs 
(consultation, 
functional, 
passive) 
National 
government 
(consultation, 
functional) 
International 
donors 
(consultation) 
Private 
organizations 
(functional, 
passive) 
Media 
(functional) 
Local 
government 
(passive) 
Local NGOs 
(functional) 
Local government 
(functional, passive) 
Local community 
(functional) 
National government 
(passive) 
Local NGOs (self-
mobilization, 
functional) 
International NGOs 
(self-mobilization, 
functional) 
National 
government (self-
mobilization) 
Local community 
(functional, self-
mobilization) 
Academic 
institutions 
(functional) 
Mechanisms Economic 
Monitoring 
Legal 
Awareness Legal 
Monitoring 
Awareness 
Legal 
Awareness 
Project 
Success 
Successful Successful Unsuccessful Unsuccessful 
Effect on 
Illegal Logging 
Monitoring and 
enforcing an 
estimated 10,000 
hectares of the 
National Park to stop 
illegal logging 
activities 
Not measured During the project, 
the greatest rate of 
forest loss occurred in 
parks which received 
the largest proportion 
funds from the 
project. 
Not measured 
Sources: (“Final” 2004), (Whitten et al. 2005), (Kerinci 2003), (“Final” 2005) 
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Indonesia Successful Case Summaries 
Indonesian successful cases, described in Table 3, depict varied donors including an international NGO 
and a multilateral donor.  The commonalities of these success cases occur in the implementation, where 
all of these projects rely on local or international NGOs to carry out the projects.  These success cases are 
all shorter and less costly when compared to the success cases with Brazil, ranging from eight to 24 
months and costing between $.02 million and $1.2 million.  Once again, there is a wide range of 
participation at various levels involved in the project.  Methods do vary, and what is most interesting is 
that the least expensive project yet reviewed was able to use mapping data analysis to demonstrate an 
impact on illegal logging.  This would suggest that cost should not necessarily be an issue when it comes 
to using satellite technology to monitor projects. 
In the Ecotourism Product Development as a Means to Supplant Illegal Logging in the Tangkahan Area of 
Leuser National Park (Ecotourism), the project demonstrates entrepreneurship at a local level to address 
the problem of illegal logging in a way that will also deter corruption.  Stakeholders at all levels came 
together, through the facilitation of the local community and local NGOs to create an economic 
alternative to illegal logging.  By creating a well-managed ecotourism market, the Ecotourism project has 
provided alternative livelihoods for at least 32 former illegal loggers.   
Not only that, but changing village regulations to permit the local community to give penalties 
empowered the local community to pay attention to monitoring the forest, which they had become more 
invested in as a result of the ecotourism benefits.  To include the National Park in the project, a revenue 
sharing system was created that both parties felt were fair by signing a Memo of Understanding.  The 
clearly defined roles, accountability expectations, and monitoring by the local community created a 
project addressing an illegal logging problem and deterring corruption.  All-in-all, this project is a perfect 
example of how decentralization can work and not fall prey to corrupt persuasions (“Final” 2004). 
In the Indonesia Forest and Media Project (INFORM), international NGOs came together with many other 
actors to make illegal logging a prominent issue in the presidential election campaigns.  The international 
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NGOs were able to boost media coverage to raise the awareness of the illegal logging problems in 
Indonesia.  This along with public debate increased awareness, culminating in illegal logging being a focal 
issue of the first and second rounds of presidential debate.  By raising this issue during the presidential 
election, the local population will become more informed about the state of their forests and potentially 
demand that their future leader have a plan to address this serious problem (Whitten et al. 2005).   
Indonesian Unsuccessful Case Summaries 
Unsuccessful projects in Indonesia were funded by a multilateral donor and an international NGO.  One 
was implemented by two parties, an international NGO and the national government, while the other was 
only implemented by a national NGO.  The projects had a wide range in terms of the cost of the project 
from $46.9 million to $.09 million and duration from 80 months to 12 months.   
In the Kerinci Seblat ICDP project, it is quite apparent that the government was simply not committed to 
this project.  Due to events outside of the project (a shift in the political and economic contexts), attempts 
to control illegal logging became too unmanageable to try to control.  Not only were project activities cut 
short due to feasibility issues, it soon became apparent that neither the BPK—Indonesia’s Supreme Audit 
Institution—nor the national government truly cared to change their tactics and improve themselves, not 
even to appease the international community (Kerinci 2003).   
Independent audits uncovered poor standards in record-keeping and unfettered illegal logging within 
parks.  When shown evidence of illegal logging in all nine active concessions, BPK’s lack of action 
demonstrated the failures of the government agency and brought into question the integrity of the 
agency.  BPK claimed that it would look into the matter later, but meaningful action from BPK, as with the 
Forestry Department of Indonesia (PHKA) or the Ministry of Forestry, was unrealistic to expect. Though 
not described in the project evaluation, the presence of illegal logging in addition to inactivity by 
government agencies combined with the deviously corrupt accounting practices indicates a high level of 
suspicion that corruption played a role in the government inoperativeness in the project.  The regions 
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where the project was most concentrated had the highest deforestation rate in KSNP, demonstrating in 
another way that the project was truly an unsuccessful case (Kerinci 2003). 
In the Implementing the Conservation Concession Approach on Sumatra’s Siberut Island (Siberut Island) 
project, a very interesting case emerges where a textbook form of corruption ruins progress.  As the 
Ministry of Forestry was working with the Siberut Island project to develop a plan to prevent illegal 
logging in a high-risk area, the Ministry of Forestry backed out of talks and turned the high-risk area into 
land that could be legally logged by a large-scale logging company.  Despite the good communication and 
an excellent prior working relationship the national NGO had with the Ministry of Forestry, the Ministry 
curiously disregarded the project it had been actively working on with the national NGO without a clear 
explanation (“Final” 2005).   
However, the national NGO that was implementing this project did not give up easily: it recognized that 
there was a split opinion between the Ministry of Forestry, the Directorate General of PHKA, and the 
Directorate General of Production Forests.  PHKA was concerned about the offshoots of illegal logging 
that would result from legalizing logging in the protected area, as this would indirectly cause local people 
to try to sell timber to this logger and create an illegal logging problem.  Production Forests and the 
Ministry of Forestry opposed retracting the logging concessions and tried to persuade the national NGO 
to monitor potential problems with the logging instead of confronting them directly (“Final” 2005).  
The national NGO leveraged this dissonance between agencies and formed working groups made up of 
experts to determine what would make the most sense for the environment, for public policy 
implications, and for the potential socio-economic impacts.  One result from these meetings was the 
demand for an investigation into corruption in the local government and in the Head of the Forestry 
Office.  The apparent corruption involved bribing some high-level officials made a great deal of sense.  Not 
only did the logging company target public officials, but they also offered give large sums of money to 
local government and community members in exchange for support in allowing logging (“Final” 2005). 
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Though the originally intended to set up a Conservation Management Agreement (CMA) to combat illegal 
logging, by the end of the project the national NGO had to learn to combat the new incentives in the 
forms of bribes offered to the local communities.  Many members were not in agreement with CMA 
because they knew they would receive more cash illegally selling timber to the large company.  
Additionally, the logging company had been in contact with the local community and government, 
offering cash payments to individuals in exchange for allowing the company the logging concession.  
These payments however were not intended for public benefit, but would enrich certain individuals of 
power and not benefit those that value the forest most.  This failed project demonstrates the power of 
corruption that can infiltrate governments and local communities, deeply constraining outside 
organizations that are committed to integrity and countering illegal logging activities (“Final” 2005). 
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Table 4: Uganda Successful and Unsuccessful Case Overviews 
Project Title Echuya Project Empowering and Strengthening Civil 
Society for Participatory Forest 
Management in East Africa 
Carbon Sequestration 
Forest Project 
Donor Bilateral donor Bilateral donor Private organization 
Implementer National NGO 
National 
government 
National NGO National government 
Duration 
(months) 
60 48 36 
Cost (USD) $554,085 Unknown Unknown 
Participant 
(level of 
participation) 
Local government 
(interactive) 
National 
government (self-
mobilization) 
Local NGOs 
(interactive) 
Indigenous 
community 
(interactive) 
National NGOs 
(interactive) 
Local community 
(interactive) 
National government (passive) 
International NGOs (interactive, 
consultation) 
Local NGOs (material incentives) 
Local community (passive) 
National government 
(interactive, functional) 
International NGO 
(functional) 
Local community 
(manipulative, material 
incentives) 
Indigenous community 
(manipulative) 
Mechanisms Economic 
Awareness 
Awareness Monitoring 
Economic 
Project Success Successful Unsuccessful Unsuccessful 
Effect on Illegal 
Logging 
Not measured Not measured Not successfully 
measured 
Sources: (Mugisha 2011), (Mupada 2009), (Hubertz 2009), (Byakola 2006), (Lang and Byakola 2007) 
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Uganda Successful Case Summary 
Clear success cases in Uganda are difficult to encounter.  This may be due in part to the reality that fewer 
projects focused on illegal logging have been undertaken in Uganda so there are fewer to choose from, 
and even fewer that are successful.  Despite months of searching, there is only one project that could be 
found that can be considered a true success.  This project was sponsored by a bilateral donor and was 
implemented through the national government and a national NGO.  Over the course of the 60 month 
program $.55 million was spent on engagements with many highly involved participants.   
The Echuya project was successful in not only increasing awareness but also identifying economic 
alternatives that still promoted forest conservation.  The community was overly dependent on the forest 
before the project because they did not know alternatives to this way of life.  By removing what would 
have otherwise been illegal logging (which created opportunities for corruption and bribery) and replacing 
it with a legal form of logging (harvesting bamboo), the Echuya project has given people a new way of life.  
No longer must they be forced with the hard choice between illegally depleting the forests and not being 
able to cook, build a home, or eat.  These actions have also improved relations between the local 
community and the National Forestry Authority, who felt previously at odds with the local community.  
Now, over the 3403 hectares in the Echuya forest, the local community has added 240,000 trees to begin 
the process of revitalizing their forests and transitioning to sustainable forestry practices (Mugisha 2011). 
Uganda Unsuccessful Case Summaries 
The two unsuccessful cases of Uganda are shown in Table 3 have almost nothing in common.  In the first, 
a bilateral donor sponsors a national NGO for 48 months to raise awareness, while in the second a private 
organization works with Uganda National Parks over 36 months to monitor forests and stimulate 
economic growth.  Even every level of involvement with the participants is different.  The only areas they 
have in common are that they did not disclose the cost of the projects nor were they interested in 
carrying out an impact analysis on illegal logging. 
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The Empowering and Strengthening Civil Society for Participatory Forest Management in East Africa 
(EMPAFORM) project is highly donor-driven.  Though the stated objective involves training local people to 
manage the forests in a sustainable way, with the benefits specifically directed towards impoverished 
local community members most dependent on the forests, Ugandans in this project did not appear to 
understand the concept of pro-poor over the four years of this project nor seem to be in agreement with 
the cost-sharing aspects of creating Participatory Forest Management (PFM).  While there may have been 
some good achieved through knowledge sharing, the people involved (including the turnover of three 
different National Project Coordinators) clearly were not invested in this project any more than they were 
getting paid to be (Mupada 2009). 
Moreover, some with the implementing NGO in Uganda went a step beyond and in fact, according to 
page 16 of the project evaluation, created “some benefit sharing on informal agreements, especially with 
regards to NTFP, but also examples of benefit sharing around impounded illegal timber in Mabira and 
Budongo.”  This act goes beyond disrespect or lack of understanding.  This is blatantly making an 
agreement to participate in corrupt behavior as a trusted member of an NGO which has stated objectives 
that are against illegal logging.  It is clear that this PFM creation was forced upon the Ugandans through 
this project without them understanding it or supporting it independently (Hubertz 2009). 
In summarizing the Carbon Sequestration Forest Project (Mount Elgon) project, it is important to look to 
the most knowledgeable source, the donor.  Once at the donor’s website though, no results will appear 
for any information on this project.  However, a simple search on the internet will bring up a through list 
of problems with this project including land ownership skepticism, increased deforestation outside of the 
forest causing land-slides, worsening water quality, and loss of diverse tree species (Byakola 2006).   
To prepare the forest for management by this project, officials evicted the forest people who were living 
and logging illegally in a national forest.  But the eviction was not peaceful.  Officials were beating up, 
torturing, and raping the forest people as well as shooting their livestock.  Anyone who was not in the 
area to which they were evicted would have to pay a bribe after 5 pm or face more brutality.  Bribery was 
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also commonplace when the surveyors were changing the boundaries around the park (Lang and Byakola 
2007).   
The choices for local farmers were either lose their livelihood and have their lands included in the park 
boundaries or pay the bribe being demanded and continue farming and owning their land.  Furthermore, 
because of all of the evictions, the population had dramatically increased around the park.  This worsened 
illegal logging, specifically near the edge of the park instead of dispersed illegal logging throughout.  The 
evicted people became homeless with limited options but to bribe their way into the forest to be able to 
survive.  This unsuccessful project demonstrates not only the poor planning and lack of communication 
between the implementers, government, and local community, but also how corruption when unchecked 
can creep into so many aspects of these poorly designed projects (Lang and Byakola 2007).   
ANALYSIS 
Based on the components described in the methodology section of donor, implementer, duration, cost, 
participants, level of participation, and mechanism; it is important to describe any observations of 
similarities or differences within the successful and projects that were reviewed.  This analysis does not 
contain generalizable findings, but rather is an insight into what can be summarized from these successful 
and unsuccessful projects.  These observations are useful to only give a description of what is happening 
in these projects and is not testing a hypothesis.  These descriptions will be considered in developing 
hypotheses for building a theoretical framework that can be tested in future research. 
Donor 
Donors of successful projects were multilateral donors, bilateral donors, and an international NGO; 
donors of unsuccessful projects were the multilateral donors, bilateral donors, an international NGO, and 
a private organization.  There was only one account of a clearly unsuccessful private organization, but that 
does not necessarily indicate that private organizations would only or always be unsuccessful in projects 
to stop or prevent illegal logging. 
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Though multilateral donors had greatest number of unsuccessful projects and bilateral donors had the 
greatest number of successful projects, it seems that no donor has developed a perfected method when it 
comes to successful projects fighting illegal logging.  It is also important to recognize that foreign 
governments may have a great vested interest in having successful projects in order to have some level of 
accountability to their citizens for the money that they are spending on other countries, and they may 
have worded their project evaluations to have a more positive tone or include more positive details than 
the project would warrant. 
Project donors in Brazil were primarily bilateral and multilateral donors.  This could suggest that the 
institutional setup and incentives of bilateral and multilateral donors worked well with the institutional 
setups in Brazil, especially since Brazil’s forestry agency is strongest when compared with Indonesia’s and 
Uganda’s.  The two multilateral projects that were unsuccessful instituted top-down approaches, whereas 
the three successful projects with bilateral donors sponsored two grassroots approaches and one top-
down approach.  This may demonstrate that in these cases, because the illegal logging in Brazil is typically 
small to medium-scale, grassroots approaches were more successful in these projects than top-down 
approaches. 
Donors in Indonesia were multilateral donors and international NGOs.  The two successful projects (one 
with an international NGO donor and one with a multilateral donor) relied heavily on grassroots 
approaches.  In the two unsuccessful projects (again with an international NGO donor and a multilateral 
donor), corruption and political changes undermined the donor project plan and resulted in no or 
negative progress was made. 
Project donors in Uganda were bilateral donors and a private organization.  The successful project was 
designed with a grassroots approach, and of the unsuccessful projects one with a bilateral donor was 
designed with a grassroots approach and one with the private organization was designed as a project 
implemented from the top-down. 
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Implementer 
Implementers of successful projects were local NGOs, national NGOs, international NGOs, national 
government, and academic institutions; implementers of unsuccessful projects were local government, 
national government, national NGOs, and international NGOs.  Once again, it appears that none of the 
classifications given to implementers has a perfect record across the different contexts of the countries in 
these cases.  While local NGOs and academic institutions were not implementers of any of the 
unsuccessful projects and were each in one successful project that was reviewed, it does not appear that 
involving these groups as implementers is necessary for a successful project in any of these cases.  Further 
research is needed to determine if these groups may always have a positive impact when implementing a 
project against illegal logging. 
Implementers in Brazil included government bodies in five of the six projects reviewed.  This is logical 
because government does have some capacities to enforce illegal logging regulations and an increase in 
funding would logically be able to boost those capacities.  The two successful projects including the 
government as implementers used the national government, while the two unsuccessful projects worked 
strongly with the local governments as implementers.  The local governments may not have had the 
strong institutional support that the national government had and may not have had the resources in 
these cases to carry out the projects successfully.  In addition, national government officials may have 
been offended that they were not a part of the project and undertaken activities to sabotage some of the 
objectives.  The project implemented by the international NGO was a localized grassroots project that 
initially was in conflict with IBAMA, but was able to develop a manageable working relationship based on 
cooperation with the government agency by the end of the project. 
Projects in Indonesia relied heavily on NGOs (local, national, and international) to implement their 
projects.  One unsuccessful case involved the national government as an implementer, and failed in part 
because of the corruption and lack of work ethic that the government officials brought into the project.  
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The low capacity by the state in Indonesia in these projects may have made NGOs the next logical choice 
as project implementers because of the strong civil society presence in Indonesia. 
Uganda projects used the national government and national NGOs as implementers with varying results.  
The national government and a national NGO worked well at a grassroots level in the only successful 
project identified.  The national NGO at the grassroots level in the unsuccessful project was corrupt, and it 
should be noted came about as a result of the project, not because Ugandans initiated the development 
of the national NGO as a result of local demand.  Corruption was also heavy in the top-down 
implementation by the national government of the second unsuccessful project.  This project was also 
assuredly not in line with the local desires or beliefs and the national government implemented this 
project in a lawless manner. 
Duration 
The range of project durations was from eight to 120 months for successful projects and from 12 to 118 
months for unsuccessful projects.  The length of the project seemed to be irrelevant to the success or 
failure of a project for the cases reviewed in this research.  It is worthwhile to note that Brazil projects did 
include the three longest projects, which may indicate a confidence on the part of the donors that the 
Brazilian government as an implementer has a strong capacity to manage and execute projects with long 
durations.  The Indonesian projects reviewed contained the three shortest project durations, which may 
indicate that in these projects donors did not believe there was a capacity for the NGOs in Indonesia to 
carry out long-running projects.  
Cost 
As mentioned in the methodology section of this research, because costs could not be divided into areas 
that only affected illegal logging, it is not helpful to draw any hypotheses from the costs that were 
provided.  Including these costs only served as a guide to help the reader understand the magnitude of 
the projects and create a better portrayal of the individual projects.  While these numbers do include 
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activities that may not be directly related to illegal logging, they still provide an idea of the capacity and 
level of administration needed by the implementers to operate these projects. 
Participant 
In successful projects reviewed, four to seven groups of participants were involved in projects, including 
local NGOs, national NGOs, international NGOs, local government, national government, foreign 
governments, local community, private organizations, academic institutions, the donor, indigenous 
community, and media.  In unsuccessful projects reviewed, three to five groups of participants were 
involved in projects including local government, national government, local NGOs, international NGOs, 
academic institutions, local community, and indigenous community.   
The donor, the media, and national NGOs all appeared in successful but not unsuccessful cases in the 
projects that were reviewed for this research.  In those successful projects though, the donor, media, and 
national NGO involvement did not appear necessary in order to achieve the successful project.  While the 
basic information regarding participants is central to this research, the number of participants or category 
of participant alone may not present a full picture of these projects.  It is also essential to characterize the 
types of participation of each group involved with the project.   
Type of Participation 
This data is slightly more difficult to interpret because there are so many variables involved in the coding.  
It is also important to again note that these levels of participation are based on the interpretation of 
documents related to project evaluations, and therefore, may be different from results that would have 
been obtained through primary sources such as interviews with stakeholders.   
Successful and unsuccessful projects each used all forms of Pretty’s typology of participation: 
manipulative participation, passive participation, participation by consultation, participation for material 
incentives, functional participation, interactive participation, and self-mobilization.  No two projects 
reviewed in this research had identical levels of participation.  Each project was a unique blend of actors 
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at different levels of participation with no real pattern between those with success and those without 
success, even when broken down by country.  Therefore, the absence or presence of these types of 
participants was not observed in these projects to indicate the success or failure or a project to combat 
illegal logging.  However, the breadth of the information gathered regarding participation, as obtained 
from the project evaluations may be overwhelming any hypotheses that may have been realized by 
focusing on fewer participation variables.  Further research is needed in this area to determine any 
potential hypotheses regarding types of participation in illegal logging project successes and failures. 
Mechanism 
Mechanisms used in successful and unsuccessful projects both were economic, legal, awareness, and 
monitoring.  Thus, the inclusion or exclusion of these mechanisms in projects does not appear to lie at the 
root as to why these illegal logging projects were successful or unsuccessful.  It appeared that in the 
unsuccessful cases, there was an unwillingness to carry out a monitoring component even if it were part 
of the project plan.  This may indicate that these projects anticipated that they may fall short and 
therefore only developed a methodology to monitor the forests without implementing it. 
In Brazil, mechanisms almost always involved a form of legal reform and monitoring component.  These 
components made sense because these projects were also relying on the government as implementers, 
whose roles include legal and monitoring responsibilities.  This may be another indicator in the projects 
reviewed that donors believed the government in Brazil had the capacity to create legal reform and 
participate in monitoring forests.  One success case did not include either of these components, nor was it 
implemented by the Brazilian government; instead it focused solely on changing the economic incentives 
to illegally log, and through that mechanism was successful at protecting forests. 
In mechanisms used in Indonesian projects reviewed for this research, three of the four projects used a 
legal and awareness component while only one used an economic component.  The economic mechanism 
in the first successful project in Indonesia was demanded by the community and well-planned, and it also 
was the major point of success in the project for changing incentives of the local community to allow 
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illegal logging.  The projects reviewed in Indonesia without an economic component may have turned an 
awareness mechanism as a way to change how people’s incentives for responding to illegal logging (and 
perhaps the Indonesian culture as a whole).  
The successful case reviewed in Uganda utilized economic and awareness components to work at a 
grassroots level to develop a project tailored to the economic needs of the community and informing 
them of their rights and roles.  In the first unsuccessful case, awareness was used as a very weak 
component.  As opposed to the Indonesia project that only focused on awareness, the Uganda project 
was poorly organized and poorly run. It had much less technical support from the bilateral donor when 
compared with the support in Indonesia from the multilateral donor.  The other failed project in Uganda 
involved top-down monitoring and economic incentives for the local community without consulting or 
planning for what their needs were.  This project also clearly failed to put in place safeguards against 
corruption, which ultimately amplified its breakdown. 
SUMMARY OF CASE STUDIES 
A summary of successful and unsuccessful case studies link best practices and lessons learned from the 
most successful and unsuccessful projects in each country.  These themes contribute to understanding 
what is working and what is not and provide a context for why projects were observed to be successful 
and unsuccessful.  Building on the review, a theoretical framework can be developed incorporating the 
observations from the 12 projects that were reviewed in this research.   
Ineffective Relocation  
As seen in the Uganda case, relocation is not the best approach to combatting illegal logging.  The Carbon 
Sequestration Forest Project demonstrates that forced relocation can be a driver of corruption, providing 
the evictors an opportunity to take advantage of evictees.  This petty corruption involved people who 
were asked to pay bribes by the surveyors to keep their property subjectively excluded from the national 
park boundaries.  People were asked to pay bribes to government officials to go into the forests and 
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extract timber illegally for fuel and building materials.  There is no evidence through forest monitoring to 
suggest that there has truly been a decrease in illegal logging or deforestation overall as a result of 
relocation (Mupadad 2009).   
Successful Economic Mechanisms  
After reviewing the Brazil and Uganda cases, it becomes easy to see why the carbon payment programs 
are highly controversial.  On one hand, the REDD project in the Brazil case has been praised as a cost-
effective approach to reduce not only illegal logging but also improving the livelihoods of those who live 
near the forests (McNeish et al. 2011).  On the other hand, the Carbon Sequestration Forest Project in 
Uganda was identified by one source as one of the worst things to happen to the Ugandans living near the 
forest.  Indigenous peoples were brutally evicted and not given compensation or alternatives.  The 
revenues for the project were not being equitably distributed, indigenous rights were not being 
respected, and illegal logging was still not being adequately addressed.  Corruption ran rampant and 
worsened the relationship between the government and the local community (Mupadad 2009).   
It can be clearly seen with these REDD projects the treatment of the local people and implementation of 
the project conditions were handled quite differently.  The capacity of the state in Brazil far outweighed 
the capacity of the state in Uganda to judiciously implement the project.  Though both projects were 
similar in design and intent, the Brazilian government was institutionally sounder and better equipped to 
monitor and enforce the project provisions. In addition, the government and the donor created an 
agreement with the flexibility for the Brazilian government to choose the best methods to carry out the 
project.  With this continued mentality of consideration taken by the role of the implementer, this project 
can continue in its success (McNeish et al. 2011).   
Other economic mechanisms that projects in conservation tend to move towards are ecotourism models.  
Many projects could easily be convinced to try to follow the route of the Ecotourism project in Indonesia, 
in which everything seemed to fall into place and work out beautifully.  It may be easy for others to 
underestimate the amount of time and consideration that goes into such a successful project.   
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The two elements that were present in the success cases here but not in the unsuccessful case are quite 
simple to identify: ample thought and dedication.  The local community in Indonesia had been planning an 
ecotourism project for a year, and it was evident that, had they not received funding from the 
international NGO, they would have still managed to successfully implement an ecotourism project.  This 
may be because they did not start a project with the hope that it would be able to sustain itself somehow; 
they developed a sound plan.  This organized NGO did independent research and knew about other 
competitors in Indonesian ecotourism, and what they could do to stand out.  Strong capacity and planning 
abilities of the NGO carrying out its project were as necessary for success as in this case as in the Brazilian 
government in the REDD project (“Final” 2004).   
Coordination  
The most incredible insights can come from effective coordination and accountability that were seen in 
every successful project and not strongly present in any unsuccessful project.  Clearly laid out plans, roles, 
and responsibilities within a project are vitally important.  As seen from the failure projects, all it takes is 
one unexpected angry stakeholder who can interfere with and even ruin the best-laid plans, such as in the 
Indonesia Siberut project.   
Preparing for the bribery scenario that happened in the Siberut project would have been unreasonable to 
expect of any organization.  The national NGO did the best it could and maintained its commitment and 
thoughtfulness to fight the logging company to the end of the project timeframe.  By initiating the 
working groups, which determined that logging in the designated area would have been detrimental in 
multiple areas, the national NGO maintained its coordination efforts even though the project failed 
(“Final” 2005). 
The successful projects had more than coordination; they had good relationships with all stakeholders.  
Even in the Ugandan successful Echuya Project the relationship between the community and the 
government may have begun tense, but by the end of the project it had significantly improved into a 
positive working relationship.  A lot of the relationships developed in the projects reviewed have 
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appeared to be personal such as the Indonesian successful Ecotourism relationships with the Ministry of 
Finance and National Park.  Government ministers were very happy to work with this new group, but 
clashed with the Siberut Island project that also was working with those same industries.   
Satellite Technology  
Most surprising was the very limited amount of monitoring of forests when part of the project goal was to 
preserve them.  The amount of knowledge that was gained on the actual difference in illegal logging 
before and after the project is otherwise lost.  It is astounding particularly because forests are quite easily 
monitored: trees are either present or not present.  With the advent of geographic information system 
(GIS) technology, it is a wonder that these projects did not incorporate this technology to monitor and 
evaluate if a project was in fact successful.  Out of all of the projects reviewed, only two included an 
evaluation for the success of the project using GIS, and both were on extremely tight budgets.  This is an 
effective evaluation tool that is simply not being used in development projects targeting illegal logging. 
Beyond GIS, Brazil has a world-renowned system which takes advantage of satellite technology to monitor 
land-use change.  This has resulted in more information for the Brazilian government about where the 
illegal logging problems are in such a large country with many protected forests.  This capacity combined 
with online databases provides transparency to other government officials and the public about exactly 
where illegal logging problems exist and can give nearly real-time access to audit and verifying the forest 
agencies and logging companies.  In addition, the public access to this information allows anyone, 
especially NGOs who are passionate about saving forests, to use this information to stay well-informed on 
the government, private, and illegal actors (McNeish et al. 2011).   
Appropriate Community Management 
The successful Brazilian MSDR project demonstrated local demand and ownership of the forest, while the 
unsuccessful Ugandan EMPAFORM project demonstrated neither of those aptitudes (Koziell and Inoue 
2006)(Mupadad 2009).  The successful Ugandan Echuya Project fell somewhere in the middle because the 
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local community initially needed to be convinced of the benefits of participatory forest management 
before they became in agreement with a local management system.  After becoming informed and aware 
of the benefits, they are now very satisfied with the system developed by the project.   
The lesson to observe in these cases is to begin a project to create local forestry management after there 
is agreement with the local community.  In order for it to be as truly owned and as successful as the MSDR 
project, there first must be a full commitment to and ownership of the forest by the local community who 
will be responsible for this forest.  Finding a person or group who is already committed and thoughtful has 
been observed in the cases reviewed to likely lead to success (especially if it is a well-coordinated group or 
individual). 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In review, the literature generally agreed that the two basic plans for fighting illegal logging and 
corruption were through a top-down approach or a grassroots movement.  In studying these 12 projects, 
it seems that both types can fail or become successful based on factors including state capacity, the form 
of corruption, and the implementing agent.  The most striking aspects of the successful case studies 
involved a high amount of coordination, thoughtfulness, and commitment.   
In Brazil, the state has a medium capacity to fight illegal logging from mostly medium and small-scale 
illegal loggers.  The corruption tends to be petty; with a commitment of integrity from the top-down and 
high accountability mechanisms in place to safeguard against corruption within IBAMA, a partnership with 
national government appears to be a strong model for success in the projects reviewed.  The capacity by 
the government to monitor and its enforcement capabilities make the national government an essential 
component to projects.  Not only that, IBAMA appeared to become insulted by not being included in a 
project design and retaliated against the project.  Because of these cases, one hypothesis generated from 
this research is that countries with medium capacities to fight small to medium-scale illegal logging, 
where the corruption is petty, and where strong monitoring and accountability mechanisms are in place 
for the national government will add to the success of projects fighting illegal logging.   
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In Indonesia, relying on the national government with its high levels of grand corruption appeared to be 
the downfall of at least one project targeting illegal logging.  In addition, the high influence that the large-
scale logging exhibit in Indonesia bred grand corruption and undermined any legitimate government 
attempts at controlling illegal logging.  The low capacity of the Ministry of Forestry, with minimal support 
from the local authorities, made this an ideal setting to utilize NGOs as project implementers.  Since it is 
known that there is also rampant petty corruption, NGOs are especially ideal to bypass potential 
corruption problems that donors may have in giving aid directly to the government.  These cases provide 
the basis for a hypothesis that in countries with large-scale illegal logging, where corruption is present in 
grand and petty forms, and with no strong monitoring and accountability mechanisms in place, NGOs are 
essential to rely upon to implement successful projects. 
Uganda has even less capacity in its forestry agencies than Indonesia, and even more petty corruption, 
which is seen in the small scale illegal logging in Uganda.  Because the corruption there is so decentralized 
and engrained in everyday life, the research observed one project involving an NGO tasked with 
improving the illegal logging that was actually perpetuating it.  Corruption can also be observed at a grand 
scale in Uganda at very high levels in both forestry agencies.  In this case, it appeared that neither the 
government nor an NGO were ideal to implement the project because both would only be seeking the 
funds that the project would provide and not be authentically interested in decreasing illegal logging.   
While it may be tempting to consider an outside implementer (either in physical location or cultural 
traits), the acceptance of the community may suffer from using an outside implementer and result in 
hindering the project tremendously.  Additionally, it is important to be building capacity for Ugandans 
that they may be able to confront illegal logging without donor assistance.  The rampant low-level 
corruption that is so common throughout the country serves as a warning that extra precautions must be 
put in place.  Thus from the observations in projects reviewed, a hypothesis for countries like Uganda that 
suffer from petty corruption and grand corruption, small-scale illegal logging, and have no strong 
monitoring and accountability mechanisms in place, NGOs may still be considered essential as 
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implementers after a thorough vetting process to ensure legitimacy and include a project design with 
stringent transparency and accountability mechanisms in place. 
In this research, what stood out more than the expected project components were the coordination and 
relationships that the successful projects were able to cultivate.  There is another element here that is 
more personal which previous literature on corruption and illegal logging have either ignored or 
downplayed.  There is an element of almost comradery that has been present in the successful cases that 
is lacking in the others.  It seems that success in projects, while it requires a good plan and design, may be 
more dependent on personal connections that have been built between local communities, NGOs, 
governments, and donors.   
In the unsuccessful projects, it was easy to determine all in which actors did not have a good relationship 
with the others and how that relationship strained the projects.  In the other unsuccessful projects too, it 
seemed that critical relationships with other stakeholders involved in the project were not present.  While 
it could only be speculation to determine how and why these relationships came about and what they 
mean, future research focusing on interviewing the stakeholders of successful projects and studying those 
relationships may prove to be quite valuable.   
In order to have a successful project, whether it is a top-down or grassroots approach, all of the projects 
reviewed here had good relationships with the stakeholders in the projects, regardless of the culture, 
institution, or country.  This is not to say that they were good relationships to at the beginning of all the 
projects, but by the end of the successful projects it was clear in the project evaluations that there was no 
longer tension or mistrust.  The capacity to build a positive relationship needs to be present at the 
beginning of the project though as a precursor to success.   
Additionally, coordination and accountability were present in all of the successful cases.  Each stakeholder 
had a well-defined role that they accepted and carried out, bringing all of the people involved in the 
project together in an organized structure.  In cases where one group was not managing another but 
acting as equals, it was important to communicate roles and expectations to be met.  All stakeholders did 
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not necessarily need to be actively involved in the project formulation to have a role that they accepted 
and with which they agreed. 
All of these good relationships may be perceived as potentially corrupted or corruptible, especially when 
dealing with some of the most corrupt government agencies and local communities in the world.  It was 
clear in the Uganda EMPAFORM case that the donor perceived a good relationship while the local 
community was simply taking advantage of the donor.  Other good relationships may be based off of kick-
backs or other illegal payments for support.   
To fight these perceptions and temptations, projects detecting and preventing illegal logging must have 
one essential component that so many of the projects reviewed were lacking: GIS.  Typically, a good 
relationship built on bad premises would involve a type of facade that forests are being protected when in 
reality they are being exploited.  Using a satellite monitoring system to ensure that the forests are being 
protected can eliminate many of the ethical questions that may arise from a good relationship with an 
individual or organization known to be corrupt.  Building in a monitoring plan that is not strongly based on 
human subjectivity will reduce the potential for corruption in these projects aiming to stop illegal logging.  
Combined with good relationships, coordination, and well-defined roles, this monitoring plan can add 
some certainty and legitimacy to projects fighting illegal logging in a low-cost way. 
CONCLUSION 
Combining academic and project data has led to a more well-rounded understanding of the projects that 
are being implemented in countries with high levels of illegal logging and corruption, and cases that have 
worked well and failed.  These cases, especially the failed cases, are not reviewed frequently enough by 
people outside the organizations and by people who are not involved with the projects.  Learning from 
development organizations as well as academic evidence can bring about a blend of detailed thoughts and 
comprehensive activities to show a more accurate picture of the world of illegal logging. 
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Three hypotheses have been developed in this research based on state capacity, the form of corruption, 
and the implementing agents to confront illegal logging in the three different contexts.  In addition to 
these hypotheses, general best practice techniques were observed and included good relationships with 
stakeholders where there is clear coordination and unambiguous roles.  These important relationship 
aspects of projects need to be balanced by an objective measure of success, such as satellite monitoring 
of the areas that will be protected from illegal logging.   
It is only through future research involving more direct data collection from these projects that an even 
more developed understanding of corruption and illegal logging can be established.  Though this research 
was an important first step, it can be used as a catalyst for future research to build upon and test.  Only by 
continuing to ask questions about successful and unsuccessful cases will researchers and development 
workers be able to find appropriate way to understand and combat illegal logging.  
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